This paper focuses on the corporate governance (CG) arrangements of Institutions offering Islamic financial services (IIFS) aimed at protecting stakeholders' financial interests. Many IIFS CG issues are common with those of their conventional counterparts. Others are distinctive. In particular they offer unrestricted investment accounts that share risks with shareholders but without a voting right. This paper first reviews internal and external arrangements put in place by IIFS to protect stakeholders' financial interests. It discusses shortcomings notably in terms of potential conflict of interest between shareholders and holders of unrestricted investment accounts. It then suggests a CG framework that combines internal and external arrangements to provide safeguards to unrestricted investment account holders without overburdening IIFS' financial performance.
List of Abbreviations
Initially, IIFS developed without a clear view on the legislative and regulatory framework that should apply to them. 4 However, their conceptual foundations and operational practices have specific features that pose challenges to regulators and call for solutions beyond the simple extension of existing legislation and regulation applying to businesses offering conventional financial services (BCFS). To that effect, a number of countries have put in place laws and regulations for IIFS, and international bodies have been established to adapt conventional standards and promote harmonization of practices.
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Good governance is crucial to the ability of a business to protect the interests of its stakeholders. These interests may extend beyond the purely financial to the stakeholders' ethical, religious, or other beliefs. In the case of an institution offering Islamic financial services, its operations are required to be carried out in compliance with the principles of Shariah (Islamic Law). A corporate structure that enables a financial institution to implement good governance through Shariah-compliant operations is therefore essential for the stability and efficiency of Islamic financial services. 6 The practices of IIFS raise specific corporate governance (CG) challenges. While a number of problems are common to all financial institutions, two broad sets of CG issues are specific to IIFS. The first one arises from the need to reassure stakeholders that IIFS activities fully comply with the precepts of Islamic jurisprudence. 7 Ultimately, the core mission of such an institution is to meet its stakeholders' desire to conduct their financial business according to Shariah principles. The same stakeholders also need to be assured that the firm will nonetheless actively promote their financial interest, and prove to be an efficient, stable and trustworthy provider of financial services. This combination of Shariah compliance and business performance raises specific challenges and agency problems, and underlines the need for distinctive CG structures. This paper focuses on CG arrangements aimed at protecting stakeholders' financial interests. 8 Given that the core mission of an Islamic financial institution is to enable its stakeholders to pursue their financial interests without breaching their religious beliefs, the CG arrangements for IIFS cannot underestimate the importance of having a framework that credibly protects these financial interests. Mission statements appear to identify four categories of stakeholders: shareholders, "depositors", "borrowers" and Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) and the Liquidity Management Center (LMC). Rather than seeking to replace existing regulation, these bodies propose solutions whenever conventional regulation fails to address the distinctiveness of the Islamic financial industry. 6 Annex I provides a glossary of Arabic terms. 7 Islamic jurisprudence is also known as Fiqh. It covers all aspects of life: religious, political, social and economic. It is mainly based on interpretations of the Qur'an and Sunna (saying and deeds of the prophet).
socially vulnerable groups. Internal CG mechanisms should be designed to ensure that the interests of all these stakeholders' are looked after. Broader institutional arrangements, or external mechanisms, would complement internal arrangements and enhance their effectiveness.
Section A of this paper reviews prevailing internal and external CG arrangements to protect stakeholders' financial interests in IIFS and identifies shortcomings. Section B suggests measures to overcome these shortcomings.
A. Protecting Stakeholders' Financial Interests: Current
Practice and Shortcomings
Internal Arrangements
IIFS generally put in place CG structure and systems similar to those of BCFS to handle traditional agency problems between shareholders and management. Although not specific to IIFS, the protection of small shareholders may be equally important for them.
Indeed, concentrated ownership and control may be more widespread in IIFS than with BCFS. Table I shows that out of a sample of 21 IIFS for which shareholder information was exhaustive, 9 appear to be family owned and controlled, about 43% of the sample.
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This translates into a concentration of control of executive decisions and a monolithic board of directors that may be biased in favor of specific interests, unless adequately checked. Small shareholders as well as other stakeholders may accordingly be at risk. For example, management may use discretion in the funds they commingle to finance specific investments and provide better yields to dominant shareholders. 10 9 Data were collected through IIFS websites as well as the Bankscope and Capital Intelligence databases. Control is defined as effective control power over the enterprise.
Further research may want to analyze more rigorously ownership structure differences between IIFS and BCFS. In particular, research may want to explore the ratio of independent directors to all directors in IIFS to verify whether family ownership effectively leads to episodes of board capture. 10 Paradoxically, family ownership in non-financial firms may solve the problems deriving from Bearle and Means' (1932) separation of ownership from control. However, in financial firms, where substantial funds are contributed by depositors and not equity holders, this type of ownership worsens the position of nonshareholder stakeholders. Given the importance attached by IIFS to stakeholders, this represents a relevant problem for them. Public ownership is also a frequent feature of IIFS (Table I) . 11 This raises the issue of contingent liability for public finances and the protection of the ultimate shareholder, the public at large. It also points to the need to pay attention to CG features that would provide management with enough leeway to operate at arms length from public authorities. Nonetheless, these CG issues are not specific to IIFS, and conventional approaches can be helpful to IIFS in addressing them.
Next to shareholders, depositors are a second category of IIFS' stakeholders.
Generally, IIFS offer three broad categories of deposit accounts: current, restricted investment and unrestricted investment. 12 Each category raises some CG issues, but those of unrestricted investment account holders (UIAH) may be the most challenging. Current and restricted accounts are briefly considered before turning to UIAH.
Current accounts (CA) in Islamic finance may take three general forms depending on national jurisdictions. In Amana deposits, the financial institution acts as a trustee and promises to pay back the deposit in full. An example is the Jordan Islamic bank that offers "trust deposits". As the bank's terms and conditions state, "the bank may use such deposits at its own risk and responsibility in respect of profit and loss as these accounts do not share in investment risks and consequently do not share in investment profit or losses". Likewise, in a qard hassan, goodwill loan, the bank receives a loan from 11 The survey shows that 24% of IIFS are fully state controlled (i.e. the state is the ultimate controller through golden shares of majority ownership). However, state ownership rises to 57% when one includes partial state ownership (without ultimate control). 12 Most IIFS also offer savings accounts. However, they usually fall in either the category of term investments or in that of current accounts. We therefore only distinguish between investment deposits and current account deposits. UIA holders are the third and often most important category of IIFS depositors.
They are a characteristic feature of Islamic finance, raising a distinctive CG challenge.
Essentially, it is the asymmetry between the extent of these depositors' participation in bearing the financial institution's risks and their ability to influence the institution's business conduct. Usually, UIA holders enter into a mudaraba contract with the institution. 15 The essence of the contract is that the financial institution manages their funds and shares with them returns according to a predetermined ratio. Funds provided by the UIA holders are placed in investment pools and profits on investments, if any, are distributed at maturity according to the profit and loss sharing (PLS) ratio specified in the contract. The UIA holders, and not the financial institution, bear the risk of the performance of the investment pool, except for misconduct on the part of the institution.
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Thus, UIA holders are stakeholders akin to shareholders. They are principals entrusting their resources to an agent, in this case the management of the Islamic financial institution. A significant difference, however, is that the agent is appointed by another principal, the shareholder. Whereas the latter can influence business conduct through CG structures and processes in place, UIA holders do not have any similar channel to express their views. Their only option is the withdrawal of their funds, i.e. "exit" from the enterprise, when feasible. In short, UIA holders constitute a sui generis category of depositors with neither the capital value nor the returns on their deposits ex-ante guaranteed in principle. They do not have an institutional "voice" on the conduct of the business, and delegate the appointment of their agent to another principal whose interests may not always accord with theirs. 15 The case of Wakalah UIAs, which are based on an agency relationship with the IIFS earning a flat fee, rather than a share of profits, is not considered here. 16 This risk-sharing feature has led some to argue that UIA are not liabilities for the IIFS and accordingly they should not be required to meet the same capital requirements as BCFS. In particular, the credit and market risk would fall on depositors, while the bank would only be subject to operational risk.
The investment decisions in IIFS are controlled by a board of directors that is accountable to shareholders whose interests may be at odds with those of UIA holders. In particular, the larger the share of profits distributed to such investors, the lower will be the dividend payments to shareholders. In principle, this should not constitute a problem,
given that the allocation of returns is governed by the ratio specified in the mudaraba contract. However, IIFS commingle shareholders and investment funds in common pools, which gives the management the leeway to direct resources of influential principals to projects with the likelihood of better returns. The incentive may be stronger In addition, UIA holders do not have a say in the management and use of reserve funds to which they are implicitly required to contribute. IIFS generally put in place reserve funds with the stated objective of providing a cushion of resources that can be used to weather adverse developments in the investment portfolio. 19 They are considered important to deal with competitive pressure from BCFS and other IIFS. Returns to UIA holders vary according to the performance of the financial institution. Therefore, UIA holders may be induced to transfer their funds to better performing IIFS. To mitigate such a risk, IIFS set up profit equalization reserves and use them in periods of poor performance to complement the returns that would be due to these depositors. The funds are fed by retaining earnings of UIA holders in periods of high returns on investment.
Similar arrangements help the IIFS protect the principal of UIA holders. A special risk investment reserve is used for compensating a loss of principal resulting from poor investment results.
The use of profit equalization and risk investment funds raises issues pertaining to the governance of these funds and the protection of UIA holders' rights. 20 First and foremost, smoothing of returns to these depositors as currently practiced is a significant obstacle to transparency. By maintaining a stable return to this category of depositors, managers automatically send the signal that the firm is healthy and profitable, while the reality may be otherwise. Smoothing of returns therefore introduces a veil of opacity between depositors and the firm. This problem is heightened by the limited transparency on the use, size and allocation of these funds. An informal survey of 13 IIFS shows that of the 4 IIFS that admitted resorting to reserves, only 2 provide information in their financial statements and annual reports on the share of funds transferred from or to these reserves. 21 Limited disclosure does not provide comfort to UIA holders on their fair treatment. Second, these depositors lack the rights to influence the use of such resources and verify the degree of risk of management's investments. Such reserves are considered retained earnings, at least in the AAOIFI definition, and reinvested in profit-bearing activities. 22 Third, individual UIA holders may not be able to opt out of their participation to the accumulation of these reserves. A UIA holder with a long-term investment perspective may find it useful to delegate the inter-temporal allocation of his income to a financial intermediary. 23 However, a UIA holder with a high discount rate may be negatively affected by the imposition of this practice. Finally, a UIA holder who 20 We are not here concerned with the fact that the existence of such funds may be contrary to the theory of Islamic financial intermediation, in that it creates a de facto insurance against market risk. 21 For the sample used please refer to footnote 54. The only two banks that disclose use of PER are Bank Muamalat and Dubai Islamic Bank. 22 AAOIFI FAS 16 23 According to a recent study by Allen and Gale (2004) financial intermediaries appear to be as efficient as markets in inter-temporal consumption smoothing.
withdraws his deposits loses his claim on the accumulated reserves and would be practically contributing to the future consumption of other UIA holders.
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IIFS' stakeholders also include "borrowers" that need access to financial resources to pursue economic activities. IIFS' mission statements often mention the special place they give to contributing to the development of the communities they serve.
Data on the comparative performance of IIFS in this regard are not yet available.
However, it is noticeable that many IIFS attach a high importance to preferential policies for residents of their local communities. Several IIFS offer vocational training for local residents in the form of awards, or traineeships for local school or university students.
However, further research on the comparative treatment of borrowers by IIFS and BCFS is needed.
A last, but equally important, category of stakeholders is that of socially vulnerable groups. The emphasis by IIFS on their social role is not uniform. However, there is a noticeable consistency in respecting the social obligations of Islamic finance.
IIFS usually take pride in social services provided as signaled by the disclosure of their accomplishments in their annual reports. In our sample of 13 IIFS, we found that all of them discharged their almsgiving duties (Zakat) as required by the Shariah from all responsible corporate citizens. The majority also provided charitable loans (Qard Hassan) to help disadvantaged groups meet social obligations like marriage. Three IIFS also conducted charitable activities in the form of competitions, prizes, and awards.
Activities financed range from the implementation of development and humanitarian programs, and the construction of hospitals and mosques, to the financing of education, house refurbishments and in-kind donations. In general, it appears that IIFS live up to their social goals as claimed in their mission statements. 24 In this regard some banks require customers to waive their rights on these funds. For example, the terms and conditions of Islamic Bank of Britain state: "you (the UIAH) authorize us to deduct from net income your profit stabilization reserve contribution for payment into the profit stabilization reserve account. Upon such deduction you agree that you relinquish any right you may have to the monies in the profit stabilization reserve account. (www.islamic-bank.com, last visited April, 18, 2005) 
External Arrangements
Internal CG arrangements are generally reinforced by external ones that set the framework governing business activity and provide the information necessary for their official and private monitoring. These external arrangements relate to (a) the legal and regulatory prudential framework governing IIFS activities, and to (b) the financial information infrastructure that permits their monitoring. In principle, each of these approaches presents opportunities but also challenges.
For instance, maintaining a clear body of legislation and regulation applying to all deposit taking banking institutions presents the advantage of clarity and familiarity of regulators with existing rules. However, rules that have emerged in a conventional finance framework may not be suited to the operating principles of Islamic finance. The premise that IIFS function on a PLS principle and do not engage in transactions where interest is charged raises questions on the integration of IIFS in conventional regulatory systems.
Existing rules may have a negative impact on the overall performance of IIFS and consequently influence the extent to which they operate on a level playing field with their BCFS counterparts. To ensure that IIFS specificities would be accommodated in the regulatory and supervisory process, some central banks have set up Islamic banking departments or Islamic finance divisions in Securities Commissions entrusted with the regulation and supervision of IIFS (Table III) .
26 26 Annex IV details the names and powers of these departments/authorities. Legislative and regulatory issues that impact the profitability and stability of IIFS may be broadly categorized under rules on taxation, rules on permissible activities, stakeholder protection rules, and capital adequacy regulations. As regards taxation, the asset-based nature of Islamic finance requires that in a single transaction property may change ownership several times. For instance, in Shariah compliant mortgage, the property must change hands twice -from seller to bank and from bank to customer.
Accordingly, a Shariah compliant mortgage involves the payment of two sets of stamp duty while a conventional mortgage is subject to a single stamp duty. This is tantamount to an additional fee levied on IIFS. This issue has been tackled in several countries but has not attracted regulatory attention in others.
27 27 In the USA, double stamp duties on Islamic financial instruments may still apply. In the UK, on the contrary, the issue has been resolved by the gradual introduction of practical measures to tackle the issue of unfair taxation for Islamic financial products. These include relief from double stamp duty for Islamic property finance products as well as the simplification of taxation procedures for profits earned by UIAH. Until recently, no tax has been imposed on the profits disbursed to UIAH. However, such profits were fully taxable in the hands of UIAH. From now on, a small tax comparable to that levied on conventional savings accounts will be deducted at source. Accordingly, UIAH won't have to include profits from their UIA in their tax declarations. In countries with separate legislation the issue of taxation is generally addressed. 32 This does not simply apply to non-Islamic countries. In fact, the case of IFH underscored a general unawareness on the non-applicability of conventional deposit insurance to IIFS in Turkey. It also showed the risks that such unawareness may result into panic and systemic banking crises. 33 In the USA, there is at least one UIA facility (University Bank, Ann Arbor, MI) that has been licensed as a deposit and insured along Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provisions. The Bank's SSB has certified that the application of insurance was the best possible solution within regulatory constraints. In the UK, the FSA has adopted a solution that tries to reconcile depositor protection with risk and profit sharing. All UIA are insured as prescribed by the EU Directive on Deposits (94/19/EC). However, if the IIFS incurs into losses, the individual UIAH may waive its deposit insurance and voluntarily decide to bear investment losses. 34 Some national regulations are based on AAOIFI's "Statement on the Purpose & Calculation of the Capital Adequacy Ratio for Islamic Banks". AAOIFI recommends the inclusion of 50% risk-weighted assets of the UIA to cover "fiduciary risk" and "displaced commercial risk", that are arise in UIA operations. However, it does not address the risk peculiarities of IIFS assets side. This problem will be resolved by the forthcoming IFSB capital adequacy standard, which will deal with UIA and instruments on the assets' side of the balance sheet.
Generally, a regulatory framework that does not address specific IIFS issues may lead Islamic financial institutions to pursue a licensing status (e.g. non-bank) that may not correspond to the nature of their activities. It may adversely affect market development and stability as well as the institutions' performance. A careful assessment of the impact of the regulatory arrangements governing IIFS is warranted.
b) Financial Information Infrastructure
Widely available and affordable financial information supports official and private monitoring of financial businesses' performance. It promotes transparency and supports market discipline, two important ingredients of sound CG. Financial information may be particularly important for IIFS due to the private equity nature of UIAs and the assumption that UIA holders have more at stake than conventional depositors. UIA holders should therefore be interested in directly monitoring IIFS' performance.
However, this requires an institutional infrastructure which facilitates the production of accurate financial information, the availability of agents that can interpret and disseminate it, as well as arrangements to protect its integrity. On all these counts, the However, IFRS are designed for conventional businesses, including BCFS. The nature of IIFS products, their practice of setting up reserve funds to smooth profit distribution and protect the UIA holders' principal, and the commitment to distribute Zakat are among IIFS features that may not directly fit into the IFRS framework. This realization has led to the establishment in the early nineties of AAOIFI that gradually developed standards dealing with IIFS specificities. 35 While progress has been achieved with AAOIFI's work, the accounting pillar of the financial information infrastructure for IIFS continues to present two sets of weaknesses. Wherever IFRS are the only rule, they may not induce the production of financial statements reflecting IIFS' genuine performance and may give a false sense of reliability. AAOIFI standards, on the other hand, would be expected to deal adequately with IIFS specificities. However, they reduce cross-sector comparability.
In addition, the direct references to religion may discourage application in secular countries. A review of 13 auditors' reports confirms that practices vary across countries.
In particular, only 7 of the 13 sampled IIFS utilize some form of IIFS specific standards. These financial information weaknesses do not serve to create a competitive environment for IIFS. Instead, they limit the contribution that competition can bring to sound IIFS CG. 38 The principal information weakness in IIFS is the limited application of internationally accepted standards tailored to IIFS. This has the effect of reducing the accuracy of information reported as well as of diminishing comparability across IIFS. In addition, it reduces the scope for product competition and diminishes incentives to adopt corporate control mechanisms that would minimize costs. Weaknesses in producing and analysing financial information do not provide either the means for a fluid merger and acquisition activity and hence shelter managers from the threat of takeover in the event of poor performance.
38 Grosfeld and Tressel (2001) provide evidence that competition has an important complementary effect where good CG mechanisms are already in place.
B. Protecting Stakeholders' Financial Interests: Empowerment and Enabling Regulations

Internal Governance: Stakeholders' Empowerment
The protection of IIFS stakeholders' financial interests requires the application of estasblished CG principles, adapted to the framework of Islamic finance. In addition, regulators need to implement solutions that address problems specific to IIFS. First, regulators need to focus on transparency requirements, given the limited disclosures that characterize IIFS. Second, mechanisms to ensure protection of minority shareholders would seem to be at least as important in IIFS as in BCFS. Third, the practice of commingling would need attention as it decreases investors' confidence in a fair and proper use of their funds. Fourth, UIA holders need to be empowered to look after their own interests; this may require, among other things, clear and harmonized rules on the use of reserves.
Islamic financial institutions generally appear less transparent than their conventional counterparts. It is therefore necessary for an Islamic financial institution to focus on creating a culture of transparency that protects all investors. Taking the cue from the OECD principles, "disseminating information should provide for equal, timely and cost-efficient access to relevant information by users". 39 Thus, an Islamic financial institution would need to publish its corporate governance code or policy, and the process by which it is implemented.
The particular need to protect the interests of minority shareholders in an Islamic financial institution arises out of the concentration of ownership frequently observed in such institutions. For instance, in an environment where the largest stockholders are also likely to occupy executive positions, CG mechanisms like executive stock options and registered shares may be counterproductive for the fair governance of the institution.
Likewise, relying on the markets for corporate takeovers is not an option when managing 39 OECD (2004) families are solidly in control through super-voting shares or majority stakes. 40 In such a situation, the ownership structure needs to contain guarantees for minority shareholders, such as the attribution of a fixed number of minority directors, or independent safeguards in the nomination of outside directors. Alternatively, regulators could consider the introduction of remedies that would allow minority owners to sue the ultimate controlling shareholders rather than managers.
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Next, the widely prevalent practice of commingling funds in an Islamic financial institution can limit the transparency of the institution's compliance with its clients' investment objectives. Accordingly, regulatory authorities need to consider rules on firewalls and sanctions for breaches. This is of paramount importance in the case of UIA holders, whose funds are usually common-pooled with those of shareholders.
Finally, the regulatory framework needs to address UIA holders' rights and their protection. Three alternative options to empowering and protecting UIA holders could be considered. One, rights that normally belong to equity-holders can be extended to UIA holders. Two, going in the opposite direction, UIA holders could be granted full debtholding status and the protection it carries. Three, the sui generis status of UIA holders could be maintained, provided that specific governance structures for protecting their interests are in place. Each of these options is discussed below.
On the first option, of extending shareholders' rights and duties to UIA holders, it can be argued that, given the equity-like investment of these depositors, they should be on an equal footing with shareholders and thus have the right to elect board representatives. This would increase their ability to air their demands and concerns with management. It would also satisfy depositors' demand for greater involvement in the strategic management of the bank.
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However, the election of UIA holders' representatives may fragment the board of directors along conflicting demands of different groups. Operationally, this could lead to decisional deadlocks to the detriment of efficient management and profit performance. In addition, the extension of shareholders' rights to UIAH raises a legal issue. This category of depositors and shareholders are subject to two very different types of legal liabilities.
The liability of investment account holders is limited to losses occurring on their investments. On the other hand, the liability of shareholders covers all losses which the bank may incur in the course of its business, including losses from funds provided by current account holders. In this light, the power to elect board representatives would give UIA holders a role in the strategic management of the entire institution that might not be commensurate with their risks.
If extending shareholders' rights to UIA holders is deemed impractical, depositors' protection could be another option. In most financial systems, regulators act on behalf of debt-holders by requiring insurance on all deposits and taking control away from equity holders in case of distress. The PLS nature of investment accounts prevents however the application of deposit insurance as it is. Accordingly, a Shariah-compliant version of deposit insurance could be put in place. It would cover current account holders under all circumstances of bank insolvency and UIA holders only in cases of insolvency resulting from proven fraudulent mismanagement. 43 Such a measure may reduce systemic risk associated with bank panic behavior and permit redress for UIA holders affected by the failure of an Islamic financial institution.
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The objections to deposit protection schemes are well documented in a vast body of literature that stresses the moral hazard of deposit insurance as well as the collective action implications. 45 The latter point may be especially relevant in the case of IIFS. In theory, UIA holders could be considered to have a higher degree of sophistication than conventional bank depositors, and therefore be less inclined to leave the monitoring of the institution's performance to others. Thus, deposit protection schemes may prove to be a more significant disincentive to oversight of managers' decisions. More importantly, the establishment of protection mechanisms does not guarantee per se an impartial conduct of business, because it leaves unchanged those governance structures that would permit a shareholder-controlled management to be biased against UIA holders in determining investment policies.
A third option would be to put in place new governance structures that cater to the specific needs of UIA holders. One possibility is the election of a special representative or a body that would act as intermediary and, if necessary, whistle blower. The main rationale for such a mechanism would be the creation of a permanent institutional channel to facilitate information flows from and to this category of depositors. While theoretically feasible, this policy presents drawbacks. In particular, the creation of a new agent would bring with it additional agency problems and the risk of multiplying, rather than diffusing, the asymmetries of information to which these depositors are subject.
There is no guarantee that UIA holders would effectively monitor the conduct of their representative or that the representative would be immune from opportunistic behavior, such as collusion with the units of the institution in charge of appointments and remuneration. The creation of a composite body, made up of representatives from several parts of the firm, would perhaps reduce the tendency to collusion, on the assumption that the different members would check each other's behavior.
It appears, therefore, that the creation of governance bodies for the protection of UIA holders may be a reasonable solution to the immediate problem. Nonetheless, it does 45 For an empirical treatment of this issue, please refer to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) not resolve the tension between the debt-holding status of these depositors and the equity nature of their investments. Ultimately it would be necessary to find organizational solutions that resolve this conflict.
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In conjunction with mitigating conflicts of interest, regulatory efforts would need to emphasize a transparent conduct of business. In this regard, the smoothing of returns to UIA holders as currently practiced appears to be a significant obstacle to transparency.
By maintaining a stable return to this category of depositors, managers could mislead them on the institution's true performance and introduce a veil of opacity between these depositors and the institution. In addition the accumulation of PER may be an appropriation of resources by the bank, unless the choice to smooth returns is left to the investor instead of the institution's management. Accordingly, where practiced, smoothing of returns should be subject to strict requirements. Waivers on resources contributed to PER should be eliminated.
Another option is to issue "profit equalization certificates" against PER to UIA holders that they could redeem on leaving the financial institution. 47 In all circumstances, however, the financial institution should be fully transparent in the use of such funds.
AAOIFI FAS 11 provides clear principles and guidelines on this issue. In particular, it guides IIFS to disclose the shares of actual profits and use of the PER in the returns they Furthermore, it may place the IIFS on a non-level playing field with BCFS in those countries where legislation restricts the scope of activities by non-banking institutions.
Strengthening the External Environment
b) Enhancing Financial Information Flows
A comprehensive flow of quality financial information requires the standardization and harmonization of accounting and auditing practices for IIFS. Information reported in a consistent and accurate manner would provide the needed inputs to rating agencies, financial media, investment advisors, and CG analysts Current progress by rating agencies on covering IIFS augurs well for the future. In the short term, public authorities may also play an active role in supplying the infrastructure for information sharing, by creating, for instance, public rating agencies, without the intention of usurping the private sector role and exclusively where such markets are missing. Adequate provision of information also requires authorities to put in place enabling norms that allow reputable private agents to access the necessary information and respect its integrity. 52 One criticism of AAOIFI standards is that they depart too significantly from the format of IFRS. However, thanks to the ongoing review process, one may envisage a progressive adaptation of AAOIFI standards to the general IFRS format. 53 When AAOIFI standards were issued, Moody's observed the following to convey the scope of the problem: "(…)when reading these standards, the most striking realization is how little is disclosed in the current financial statements (i.e. not based on IIFS specific standards)
Conclusion
Overall, the introduction of new internal and external CG structures, together with the reinforcement of existing ones, can provide stakeholders with sufficient comfort on the actions of management and other organs of the financial institution. Internally, this requires procedures for the protection of minority shareholders and provisions for increased disclosure. In addition, concrete approaches to addressing the problems of commingling, UIA holders' rights, and the utilization of reserves would complete the internal CG of IIFS. Externally, recognizing the specificity of IIFS will contribute to the stability of the industry and the protection of its stakeholders. Regulators need to be flexible and to work with the Islamic financial institutions to fully understand the needs of the industry and thereby develop an appropriate regulatory framework. Also, recourse to private self-regulatory initiatives may be more important in Islamic finance than in BCFS. In those countries where regulations present constraints on Islamic finance, IIFS need to evaluate the available options to determine which licensing status is best tailored to their needs and those of their stakeholders. Also, in order to be able to meaningfully oversee the institution's operations, the regulatory and other authorities, as well as market participants, would need to have a full understanding of the various nuances of the legal and regulatory framework in which the institution operates. The role of public authorities should be further complemented and supported by reputable agents that would send signals to market players. This requires the existence of an IIFS specific accounting and auditing infrastructure that would facilitate timely and reliable financial information.
